Codes or Rules of Professional Conduct:
Rule 8.02-04 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct addresses statements made by lawyers about judges, adjudicatory officers, public legal officers, or candidates for election or appointment.
The Legal Information Institute's American Legal Ethics Library has links to legal ethics materials by state. It also has a comparative analysis identifying which states have a rule based upon the ABA Model Rules or Code.
For example, the New York State Bar Association's Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 8-102, provides: (A) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false statements of fact concerning the qualifications of a candidate for election or appointment to a judicial office. (B) A lawyer shall not knowingly make false accusations against a judge or other adjudicatory officer.
Some states have rules and codes that address conduct relating to a tribunal. For example,
Rule 3.5(a)(8) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct states "[A lawyer shall not] engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." DR 7-106(C)(6) provides that a lawyer shall not "engage in undignified and discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal."
Rule 3.5(c) of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "A lawyer shall not engage in undiignified or discourteous conduct toward the tribunal." Rule 6.5(a) provies that "A lawyer shall treat with courtesy and respect all persons involved in the legal process."
Vermont's Rule 3.5(c) states that "[A lawyer shall not] engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal." DR 7-106(C)(6) provides that a lawyer shall not "engage in undignified and discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal."
Cases:
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S.Ct. 2720 (U.S. Nevada 1991) ("The regulation of attorneys' speech is limited -- it applies only to speech that is substantially likely to have a materially prejudicial effect; it is neutral as to points of view, applying equally to all attorneys participating in a pending case; and it merely postpones the attorneys' comments until after the trial. While supported by the substantial state interest in preventing prejudice to an adjudicative proceeding by those who have a duty to protect its integrity, the Rule is limited on its face to preventing only speech having a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing that proceeding." 501 US at 1076. Emphasis added.)
In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 3 L.Ed.2d 1473 (U.S.Hawai'i 1959)
Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Because Yagman's statements do not pose a clear and present danger to the proper functioning of the courts, we conclude that the district court erred in sanctioning Yagman for interfering with the administration of justice." "We can't improve on the words of Justice Black in Bridges, 314 U.S. at 270-71, 62 S.Ct. at 197-98 (footnote omitted): The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the name of preserving the dignity of the bench, would probably engender resentment, suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect.")
In re Green, 11 P.3d 1078 (Colo. 2000) (Colo. RPC 8.4(d), (g) and (h)) ("Thus, because of the interests in protecting attorney speech critical of judges, we agree with those jurisdictions that have applied a version of the New York Times standard when considering discipline of attorneys who criticize judges. We hold that under the New York Times standard, a two-part inquiry applies in determining whether an attorney may be disciplined for statements criticizing a judge: (1) whether the disciplinary authority has proven that the statement was a false statement of fact (or a statement of opinion that necessarily implies an undisclosed false assertion of fact); and (2) assuming the statement is false, whether the attorney uttered the statement with actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to its truth. . . . We view Green’s statements that the judge was a "racist and bigot" and having a "bent of mind" as statements of opinion based upon fully disclosed and uncontested facts. Because Green’s statements do not involve false statements of fact or represent statements of opinion necessarily implying undisclosed false assertions of fact, we may not, consistent with the First Amendment and the first prong of the New York Times test, discipline Green for his subjective opinions, irrespective of our disagreement with them. Thus, we need not proceed to the second part of the New York Times test concerning proof of actual malice.")
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 793 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 2003)
Disciplinary Board Actions:
Grievance Administrator v. Geoffrey N. Fieger (Michigan, Nov. 11, 2004) (re: MRPC 3.5(c) and 6.5(a) and statements made in live radio broadcast). See court filings in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Geoffrey N. Fieger, Case No. 2:05-cv-72264, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit).
Law Review and other Articles:
Washington and Lee Law Review, Standing Committee on Discipline v. Yagman: Missing the point of ethical restrictions on attorney criticism of the judiciary?, Spring 1997 by Casprice L. Roberts
Kentucky Bar Association Bench & Bar, Judge Bashing, Telling It Like It Is v. Telling It Like It Ain't, Vol. 62 No. 4, September 1998, Del O'Roark